The original text: The Ethics of Belief
Relevant SEP page: Ethics of Belief
[11/01/2025]
Brackets are used to express questions that arise in my mind while reading the text.
Clifford relays a story to motivate his claims: A shipowner is going to sell tickets for a transatlantic journey. He gets doubts (they are possibly presented to him, with/without evidence) that the ship is not seaworthy. The shipowner is initially unhappy but does not investigate any further and manages to acquire a “sincere and comfortable conviction” that the vessel is safe. He sells the tickets, the ship sails and then sinks, and he collects the insurance money.
Clifford claims:
- The shipowner is guilty of the deaths of those on the ship.
- The shipowner may have been sincerely convinced (note: is this even possible?) of the seaworthiness of the ship, but he is still in the “wrong” (assumed to be a moral wrong) because “he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him”.
How does Clifford justify this?
- He had not earned the belief by patient investigation of evidence.
- He had knowingly worked himself into the state of mind where he believed in the seaworthiness.
Thus, he must be held responsible for the “wrongness” of his belief.
Clifford alters the story, imagining an outcome where the journey is completed safely. He claims that even in this case, the shipowner is in the wrong. Why?
- Clifford says that action once carried out is either right or wrong forever. No outcome, good or evil, can change that.
- The shipowner in this case was not right, he just wasn’t found out and saved by sheer accident.
In summary, Clifford believes that it does not matter if a belief turns out to be true or false, but whether the person holding said belief had a right to believe on such evidence as was before them.
Another story: A group of people are professing a religion that goes against some predominant religious notions on some islands. Those not part of this newer religion have a suspicion that those involved with it are using unfair and unethical (?) means to preach to children. In response, a group formed and they published grave accusations against the people involved with the new religion, without investigating their claims. A commission is formed to investigate them, and the accusations are found to be entirely false.
Clifford uses this to make the same claim as in the story before.
He addresses a doubt - we may say that it is not the belief that is in the wrong, but the action following upon it.
- The shipowner may say, “I am certain that the ship is safe, but it is my duty to have her examined”.
- The agitators may be told, “You may be convinced of your allegations, but you ought not to have made a public attack without investigating them further”.
Clifford admits that this view is right and necessary,
- Why right? Even with fixed belief, a person always has a choice regarding any action suggested by the belief. Thus, they have the responsibility to test their convictions.
- Why necessary? “Those who are not yet capable of controlling their feelings and thoughts must have a plain rule dealing with overt acts”. (What does this mean? Who are the people “not capable” of said control? What “overt act”?)
He points out that the view is not sufficient (clear from the fact that he calls it necessary), and that we require his previous claim (of there being no right to believe on insufficient evidence) to supplement this view. He claims that,
- It is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests. Thus, we can not condemn one without condemning the other.
Why? He reasons that a person who believes in (or, is even inclined towards) one side of an argument/question may never be able to investigate it with the fairness and completeness of someone who has no such bias. (Is it true that our biases are always stronger than our belief in the process of proper investigation?) He goes ahead and makes a stronger claim: A belief that does not have any influence on the actions of the person who holds it is not a true belief. (Then what is a belief that does not inspire action? Say, I have a belief that includes that clause that says if I ever act in a way that lets others know of said belief, I would be committing a wrong deed. Is such a thought not a belief for Clifford, or is he contesting that such a thought simply can not exist?) He claims that,
- Any person who has ever wanted to commit an action inspired by some belief has “already committed it in his heart”. (How can committing something “in the heart” equivalent in anyway to real action?)
- If a belief is not immediately causing a real action, it is “stored away” to influence future actions - it goes into some part of our minds, made up of an aggregate of beliefs, that is the link between sensation and action at all moments of our lives (So, are all of our actions motivated by a belief or some remnant of it? Are there no actions not motivated by beliefs?)
- Further, he claims that this “aggregate” can not be separated into the constituent beliefs, and each new belief inducted into it changes its structure.
- So, every belief (true belief, as he defines it) is linked to some action, ultimately. Not only that, but each belief opens us up to more similar beliefs.
As a result, Clifford argues that no person may have something akin to a “private belief”. This, combined with the claim that humans live in societies where we have shared, common heritage, leads him to draw the conclusion that any belief (no matter how trivial) has far reaching consequences. So, he extends his judgement to all beliefs held by all sorts of people, and claims that individuals have to earn their beliefs by examination because they hold these beliefs for all of humanity.
He acknowledges that the burden of such thorough examination of ourr beliefs is a heavy one, and reasons that this is not only because of the difficulty in carrying out such examination but also because we feel safe and secure in holding a fixed belief whereas doubting it makes us bare and powerless. This sense of power attached to believing is what makes people desirous of believing, and afraid of doubting. He argues that we should earn said power through our examination of evidence instead of resorting to a fake sense of power - as justified belief enriches not just the individual holding the belief but also mankind as a whole. Additionally, he claims that unjustified belief not only runs the risk (or, in his view the certainty) of wrong action, but it also encourages others to belief without justification. This perpetuates the problems of unjustified belief. On the other hand, a person who seeks evidence for or against his belief inspires a similar spirit of inquiry in others, thereby making mankind more virtuous. Thus, he states his principle - It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. He proceeds next to make an every stronger statement, saying that once inquiry has been completed to the greatest extent possible and a belief accepted, it is still the duty of every person holding a belief to continue to be open to evidence for or against the belief. (Is he not ccontradicting himself? If the belief is accepted as justified at some point in time, is the person holding the belief not “biased” as he puts it before - and thereby incapable of a fair assessment of further evidence? So, does belief-acceptance bar a person from belief-relinquishment?) He finishes the section by saying that a person who does not have the time for such inquiry should not have the time to believe.
(Notes incomplete)